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Article
When a self-report psychological inventory1 is administered, 
the expectation is that respondents follow testing instructions 
and answer its items as honestly and accurately as possible. 
That is to say they respond conscientiously and thereby 
infuse their responses with meaning about their inner psy-
chological workings. Unfortunately, not all of the data that 
respondents produce are generated consciously and, there-
fore, not all data are valid. Some individuals, for example, 
purposefully distort their responses to be perceived more 
positively or negatively than they really are. This is known as 
faking good and faking bad, respectfully (Butcher, Dahlstrom, 
Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989).
Random responding is another form of data distortion in 
which respondents endorse items indiscriminately. Random 
responders (RRs) answer items without regard for what they 
mean. For example, within a single inventory, a RR might 
answer “true” to an item like “I am taller than most people,” 
but because he or she is answering indiscriminately, answer 
“false” to a similar item such as “I am tall.” Resulting from a 
number of factors such as carelessness, fatigue, psychopa-
thology, and low intelligence (Bentler, Jackson, & Messick, 
1971), the prevalence of random responding in self-report 
data has been estimated to be up to 5% in non-disordered 
populations (Clark, Gironda, & Young, 2003; Pinsoneault, 
2002), and 10% or more in disordered and forensic popula-
tions (Archer, Handel, Lynch, & Elkins, 2002; McNulty 
et al., 2003).
For clinical and applied psychologists, the presence of 
random data in their supposed valid data sets may lead them 
to make erroneous conclusions, diagnoses, and/or predic-
tions about their clients (Ben-Porath & Waller, 1992). Bruehl, 
Lofland, Sherman, and Carlson (1998) showed this possibil-
ity in a clever study using a widely used pain inventory. They 
concluded that if the measure was administered to a group of 
RRs in a clinical setting and their random responding went 
unidentified, 35% of them would be classified as having 
elevated levels of interpersonal distress and another 35% as 
being highly adaptive copers. For researchers, random 
responding poses different problems. Primarily, it increases 
measurement error, making it more difficult to identify sig-
nificant relations when they are present in data. In other 
words, it increases the likelihood of making Type II errors 
and otherwise jeopardizes the validity of one’s results 
(Osborne & Blanchard, 2011). In a recent study, Credé 
(2010) showed that even low rates of random responding 
(e.g., 5%) can have meaningful moderating effects on the 
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This investigation introduces a novel tool for identifying conscientious responders (CRs) and random responders (RRs) in 
psychological inventory data. The Conscientious Responders Scale (CRS) is a five-item validity measure that uses instructional 
items to identify responders. Because each item instructs responders exactly how to answer that particular item, each 
response can be scored as either correct or incorrect. Given the long odds of answering a CRS item correctly by chance 
alone on a 7-point scale (14.29%), we reasoned that RRs would answer most items incorrectly, whereas CRs would answer 
them correctly. This rationale was evaluated in two experiments in which CRs’ CRS scores were compared against RRs’ 
scores. As predicted, results showed large differences in CRS scores across responder groups. Moreover, the CRS correctly 
classified responders as either conscientious or random with greater than 93% accuracy. Implications for the reliability and 
effectiveness of the CRS are discussed.
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size and direction of correlations, even increasing the likeli-
hood of making Type I errors.
Old Approaches to Detecting Random 
Responding
Historically, there have been two types of validity scales that 
have been effective at identifying RRs in self-report inven-
tory data: infrequency scales and inconsistency scales. An 
infrequency scale is composed of absurd item content—
items that are endorsed so infrequently (e.g., <10% of con-
scientious responders [CRs] answer “true” to the item “I 
drink 10 glasses of milk a day”) that it is reasonable to inter-
pret responses in the infrequent direction as highly unusual. 
If a respondent endorses too many infrequency items in the 
unusual direction, it strongly indicates the presence of ran-
dom responding and, therefore, an invalid test profile. An 
exemplar of an infrequency scale is the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory–2’s (MMPI-2) F Scale 
(Butcher et al., 1989).
The logic behind an inconsistency scale is that if individu-
als are paying attention to item content, they should respond 
consistently to items that are semantically similar and incon-
sistently to items that are semantically dissimilar. For exam-
ple, a person who answers “true” to an item like “I am a 
happy person” should also answer “true” to the item “I am 
happy.” An inconsistency scale is created by identifying 
pairs of items that are usually answered in the same way, 
usually correlating above .90 (e.g., Butcher et al., 1989). 
Given this, if a person responds inconsistently to several 
such item pairs, it strongly indicates the likelihood of ran-
dom responding and that the responder’s data are invalid. 
Exemplars of inconsistency scales are the Variable Response 
Inconsistency (VRIN) and True Response Inconsistency 
(TRIN) scales of the MMPI-2 (Butcher et al., 1989).
Although effective, researchers rarely use or develop 
these scales due to their extensive costs. First, embedding 
an infrequency scale in a questionnaire makes it longer to 
administer, making it costly in terms of fatigue for the test 
taker and labor intensive for the test administrator. More 
importantly, because researchers must expect that a small 
proportion of CRs answer these items truthfully but in the 
infrequent direction (e.g., some individuals really do drink 
10 glasses of milk a day), extensive normative testing is 
first necessary to establish base rates of infrequent respond-
ing in samples of CRs. In addition, normative testing is 
required to establish base rates for different categories of 
responders (e.g., disordered, non-disordered) and the vari-
ous settings in which these scales are likely to be adminis-
tered (e.g., vocational, forensic). For example, in a 
disordered population, one should expect that mean infre-
quency scale scores are higher than they are in a non-disor-
dered population (see Archer et al., 2002; McNulty et al., 
2003). This is partly due to the fact that in a disordered 
population, CRs are more likely to endorsee infrequency 
items in the infrequent direction. An item like “I talk to 
dead people” may be affirmatively endorsed because the 
responder actually believes he or she is communicating 
with the dead, not because they are answering indiscrimi-
nately. This has been a long-standing criticism of infre-
quency scales—that infrequency scale scores can sometimes 
confound random responding with psychopathology (Arbisi 
& Ben-Porath, 1995).
In contrast, inconsistency scales have the advantage not 
having to embed additional items in an inventory because 
they are made up of an inventory’s existing items. They do, 
however, still require an extensive amount of research to cre-
ate and validate. First, a psychologist must identify a pool of 
highly correlated items within a measure from which to cre-
ate its inconsistency scale. Subsequently, the psychologist 
must generate normative data to determine the optimal cutoff 
score that most effectively discriminates between CR and 
RR. Similar to the above concerns, some cutoff scores may 
be more appropriate to a particular responder population and 
setting than others. Consequently, the entire process is unap-
pealingly laborious, time-consuming, and complex.
Unfortunately, apart from these costly types of infre-
quency- and inconsistency-validity scales, there are currently 
no practical means for psychologists to differentiate between 
CR and RR in self-report inventory data (see Meade & Craig, 
2012, for an evaluation of item-based and statistically based 
indices). Researchers and applied psychologists alike there-
fore stand to benefit from a simple, reliable, and flexible tool 
that can effectively identify RRs in inventory data without all 
of the above mess associated with traditional validity scales. 
The development and evaluation of such a tool was the pri-
mary goal of this investigation.
Using Instructional Item Content to 
Identify Random Responding
The tool we developed for this investigation is called the 
Conscientious Responders Scale (CRS; see the appendix), 
which is a five-item variant of a traditional validity scale. 
The main advantage of the CRS over standard infrequency 
and inconsistency scales is that it does not require extensive 
normative testing to establish its cutoff scores.2 This is 
because the CRS is made up of instructional item content. 
Instructional item content directs responders how to answer 
each particular item (e.g., CRS item 3, “To respond to this 
question, please choose option number five, ‘slightly 
agree’”); thus, unlike typical psychological inventory items, 
there is an objectively correct response for every item. Each 
correct response is given a score of 1 and incorrect response 
a score of 0. A CRS total score is generated by summing up 
all of a respondent’s correct responses. Thus, scores range 
from 0 (all incorrect responses) to 5 (reflecting all correct 
responses).
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Depending on how many response options a responder 
has to choose from, the likelihood that a RR will answer an 
item correctly by chance alone can be estimated a priori 
using probability theory. In our investigation, we used a 
7-point response-option scale for all measures. 
Consequently, the probability of a RR answering a CRS 
item correctly was 14.29% (i.e., 1/k, where k is the number 
of response options). Because the probability of answering 
several items correctly is great deal lower, a high CRS 
score was very likely the result of conscientious respond-
ing. This raised the following question: How high a CRS 
score is necessary to reliably discriminate between CR and 
RR?
Calculating A Priori CRS Cutoff Scores
Using the binomial distribution, we were able to determine 
that only 2.33% of RRs would be able achieve a CRS score 
of 3 or higher by chance alone (percentage answering 3 
correct = 2.14% + 4 correct = 0.18% + 5 correct = 0.01%), 
whereas 15.19% would be able to answer 2 or more cor-
rectly by chance alone (percentage answering 2 correct = 
12.86%). In fact, most RRs would only be able to generate 
a CRS score of 0 (46.25%) or 1 (38.56%), answering 
almost no items correctly. Using the ubiquitous critical 
probability value of p < .05 as our guide, we settled on a 
2/3 cutoff score for the purposes of this investigation. That 
is, because fewer than 5% of RRs can be expected to 
achieve CRS scores of 3, 4, or 5 by chance alone, we are 
confident that these scores will be reflective of conscien-
tious responding. Thus, responders with a CRS score of 3 
or higher will be labeled “conscientious responders.” In 
contrast, responders with CRS scores of 2 or lower (i.e., 0, 
1, or 2), which are statistically indistinguishable from 
scores generated by random responding, will be labeled 
“random responders.”3
The Present Investigation: Purpose, 
Design, and Strategy
The purpose of this investigation was to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the CRS for discriminating between CR and RR 
in self-report inventory data. We evaluated our new measure 
in two identical experiments in which a single 89-item ques-
tionnaire was administered to university students either 
using a paper-and-pencil format (Experiment 1) or over the 
Internet (Experiment 2). The question of interest was 
whether CRS scores could reliably discriminate between 
RR and CR across these two widely used means for data 
collections.
According to recent studies, Internet collected data are 
equivalent to data collected through traditional methods, 
such as paper-and-pencil data questionnaires, in terms of 
psychometric properties such as factor structures, inter-scale 
correlations, means, and standard deviations (Johnson, 
2005). Importantly, Internet data have not yet been heavily 
scrutinized in terms of data distortion tendencies such as ran-
dom responding. In one such study, Pettit (2002) found that 
paper-and-pencil responders actually produced slightly 
higher rates of random responses than their Internet counter-
parts. In that study, however, the Internet participants were 
all self-selected and therefore probably highly motivated to 
participate from the outset. The extent to which the average 
undergraduate student completes questionnaires conscien-
tiously has long been a source of doubt and controversy 
among psychologists (Sears, 1986). Because students are 
often compelled to participate in psychological research as a 
means to fulfill program requirements, the typical student is 
probably less motivated to participate conscientiously than 
we expect him or her to be. Given that the Internet provides 
participants with greater anonymity than traditional forms of 
data collection, unmotivated students may take advantage 
and produce more random responding than they normally 
would on a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Experiment 2 
was conducted to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 in a 
typical online administration of a psychological question-
naire. We also included a traditionally developed infrequency 
scale in our questionnaire to serve as a comparative measure 
against which we could evaluate the effectiveness of the 
CRS.
Data were collected in both experiments using the ana-
log design (e.g., Clark et al., 2003). Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. In 
the CR condition, participants were instructed to answer 
items as honestly and accurately as possible. In the RR con-
dition, participants were given a questionnaire with no 
actual item content, only blank response options, and 
instructed to complete the response-option sheet as ran-
domly as possible.
In each experiment, the statistical strategy for evaluating 
CRS was threefold. First, group differences on CRS and 
Pettit Random Responding Scale (PRRS) scores would be 
assessed using independent-samples t tests. Hypothesis 1 
states that participants assigned to the CR group will produce 
significantly greater scores on the CRS and PRRS than par-
ticipants in the RR group. Second, because the CRS and 
PRRS purportedly measure the same construct (i.e., consci-
entious responding), we conducted a correlation analysis to 
reveal whether these measures were indeed related. 
Hypothesis 2 states that the CRS will be strongly and posi-
tively correlated with the PRRS. Finally, in order that the 
CRS proves its worth as a tool for identifying CR and RR, 
Hypothesis 3 states that it will correctly label participants in 
the CR group as “conscientious responders” and participants 
in the RR condition as “random responders” at an average 
classification accuracy rate of ≥80% (cf. Clark et al., 2003). 
This analysis was also conducted on the PRRS for the pur-
poses of comparison.
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Participants
Experiment 1. A total of 68 participants were recruited from 
a second-year psychology class in exchange for being entered 
into a draw for $50 (CAD). In total, 33 students were ran-
domly assigned to the CR condition and 35 were randomly 
assigned to the RR condition. Three participants were 
removed from the CR sample due to missing data. The final 
total sample (N = 65; CR = 30, RR = 35) consisted of 46 
women and 19 men, with a mean age of 24.22 years (SD = 
5.61). As we expected to find a “large” effect of CRS scores 
across responder groups (Cohen’s d ≥ .80), this sample size 
was more than adequate to detect statistical significance and 
avoid Type II errors.
Experiment 2. A total of 412 participants were recruited from 
an undergraduate research participant pool in exchange for 
course credit. Thirty-two participants (7.8%) were removed 
due to missing data. The final total sample (N = 380, CR = 
191 and RR = 189) consisted of 120 men, 258 women, and 2 
individuals who did not report their sex. The mean age of the 
sample was 20.67 years (SD = 3.62).
Measures
The same questionnaire was administered in both experi-
ments. In addition to the CRS and PRRS, all of the measures 
included were selected based on acceptable levels of internal 
consistency and breadth of content, such as perfectionism 
and ethics. The subject matter and validity of each scale was 
irrelevant to their selection. All of the questionnaire’s 89 
items, including the CRS and PRRS items, were presented in 
a scrambled, random order. All items were answered on a 
7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree 
to 7 = strongly agree, with 4 = neither agree nor disagree at 
the midpoint. The questionnaire consisted of the following 
measures.
Self-Esteem Scale (SES). The 10-item SES is a widely used 
self-report measure of trait self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965). It 
has acceptable internal consistency across a variety of sam-
ples and has been extensively used in psychological research 
(Blascovich & Tomaka, 1993). Higher scores reflect greater 
levels of trait self-esteem. A sample item is “I wish I could 
have more respect for myself.”
Right-Wing Authoritarianism–Short Form (SRWA). The 14-item 
SRWA (Manganelli Rattazzi, Bobbio, & Canova, 2007) was 
created by factoring Altemeyer’s (1996) 30-item RWA scale 
into two subscales measuring Authoritarian Aggression and 
Submission (SRWA-A) and Conservatism (SRWA-C). Each 
subscale has acceptable reliability and correlates highly with 
the original 30-item RWA scale (Bobbio, Canova, & Man-
ganelli, 2010). Higher scores on either subscale reflect 
greater levels of RWA. A sample item from the authoritarian 
aggression and submission scale is “The situation in our 
country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be 
justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back 
to our true path.”
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS). The 35-item MPS 
(Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990) is a scale that 
assesses six factors of trait perfectionism. Its subscales are 
Concern Over Mistakes (MPS-CM), Organization (MPS-O), 
Parental Criticism (MPS-PC), Personal Standards (MPS-
PS), Doubts (MPS-D), and Parental Expectations (MPS-PE). 
The MPS has acceptable internal consistencies, with esti-
mates for its subscales ranging between .73 and .93 (Frost et 
al., 1990), and has been used extensively in perfectionism 
research (Parker & Adkins, 1995). Higher scores reflect 
greater levels of perfectionism on all subscales. A sample 
item from the personal standards subscale is “I set higher 
goals than most people.”
Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ). The 20-item EPQ (For-
syth, 1980) measures the philosophical framework from 
which individuals justify their decisions and behaviors. It 
contains two subscales, Idealism (EPQ-I) and Relativism 
(EPQ-R), which previous research has shown to be internally 
consistent measures (e.g., Davis, Andersen, & Curtis, 2001). 
Higher scores reflect greater levels of both ethical idealism 
and relativism. A sample item from the relativism subscale is 
“Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends 
upon the circumstances surrounding the action.”
PRRS. The PRRS is a 10-item infrequency scale containing 
all absurd item content (Pettit, 1999, 2002). In the original 
scale, items endorsed in the infrequent (statistically unusual) 
direction are scored as 1s, whereas items endorsed in the fre-
quent direction are scored as 0s. We reversed this scoring 
system so that higher PRRS sum scores reflect greater con-
scientious responding, not random responding. The original 
measure’s cutoff score had also to be altered because of this 
scaling change, such that the original cutoff score of 2/3 was 
changed to 7/8. Put another way, only responders who 
achieved a high score of 8, 9, or 10 were labeled “conscien-
tious responder.” Low scorers (i.e., 7 and less) were labeled 
“random responder.”
The original scale was validated on a large Internet sam-
ple using a dichotomous response scale and its psychometric 
properties are acceptable (Pettit, 1999, 2002). Given that a 
7-point scale was used in this investigation, the likelihood of 
a RR answering an item correctly by chance alone was 
reduced from 50% to 14.29%, theoretically making the 
PRRS’ 7/8 cutoff score a more difficult standard for a RR to 
meet. A sample PRRS item is “Sometimes I feel warm or 
cool,” to which answering anything but “strongly agree” is 
an empirically infrequent response and is assigned a score 
of 0.
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CRS. The CRS is a variant of a traditional infrequency scale 
that relies on instructional item content to identify CRs and 
RRs (see the appendix). The CRS is made up of five items 
that direct the responder exactly how to answer that particu-
lar item, such that each item has only one possible correct 
response. Thus, the number of the measure’s items, as well as 
the number of response options, can be used to generate 
effective cutoff scores using probability theory. For the pur-
poses of this investigation, we adopted the p < .05 critical 
value as our standard. Using the binomial distribution, we 
calculated that fewer than 5% of RRs would be able to 
achieve a CRS score of 3, 4, or 5, and were most likely to 
achieve a score of 0, 1, or 2. Consequently, 2/3 became our 
cutoff score to discriminate between CR and RR. Higher 
scorers (3 and above) were labeled “conscientious responder” 
and low scorers (2 and below) were labeled “random 
responder.”
Procedure
Whether recruited in a second-year psychology class to com-
plete an in-class paper-and-pencil questionnaire (Experiment 1) 
or from an undergraduate research participant pool to com-
plete an online questionnaire of the same length (Experiment 
2), participants were randomly assigned to complete one of 
two versions of the 89-item questionnaire. Participants 
assigned to the CR group received standard questionnaire 
instructions with some additional language that prepared 
them for the instructional nature of the CRS items: “Some of 
the items will ask you to answer them in a particular way . . 
.” Their questionnaire contained all of the measures listed 
above. In contrast, participants assigned to the RR group 
received a questionnaire with no items inside, only a 7-point 
Likert-type scale they had to endorse for each missing item. 
These participants were instructed to “respond on the scales 
below as randomly as possible, but do this in such a way that 
it will not be apparent that this is what you did.” Thus, in an 
effort to simulate reality, participants tried not to make their 
random responses so obvious that they would be easily iden-
tified by a visual inspection of the data. These instructions 
have similarly been used in other validity scale studies that 
used the analog design (e.g., Clark et al., 2003). In the 
debriefing, no CR participants reported having any difficulty 
understanding the instructions or completing the items in the 
questionnaire.
Results
Descriptive statistics for all of the measures across responder 
groups and experiments are presented in Table 1. Our first 
analysis involved conducting independent-samples t tests to 
test Hypothesis 1. In Experiment 1, as predicted, the CR 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Across Responder Groups and Experiments..
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
 Responder group Responder group
 CR group (n = 30) RR group (n = 35) CR group (n = 191)
RR group  
(n = 189)
Measure M SD α M SD M SD α M SD
CRS 4.53 1.43 .98 0.74 0.70 4.39 1.27 .84 0.86 0.81
PRRS 8.70 1.26 .41 0.94 1.08 6.76 2.50 .80 0.94 1.09
SES 5.63 1.33 .91 3.95 0.50 5.26 0.98 .88 3.96 0.50
SRWA-A 3.16 1.40 .86 4.04 0.75 3.77 1.17 .86 4.14 0.71
SRWA-C 2.90 1.17 .81 4.10 0.76 3.26 0.98 .74 3.83 0.74
MPS-CM 2.65 1.05 .76 4.10 0.67 3.37 1.07 .86 4.16 0.67
MPS-PS 4.69 1.43 .85 3.97 0.60 4.80 0.91 .80 4.11 0.74
MPS-PE 3.76 1.74 .83 4.31 0.79 4.48 1.29 .85 4.06 0.87
MPS-PC 2.47 1.57 .87 4.27 0.75 3.22 1.40 .83 4.06 0.93
MPS-D 3.28 1.49 .73 3.91 0.82 3.66 1.12 .67 4.21 0.94
MPS-O 5.33 1.75 .93 4.18 0.71 5.24 1.12 .93 4.06 0.81
EPQ-I 4.64 1.32 .75 4.10 0.51 4.97 0.73 .72 4.04 0.69
EPQ-R 4.35 1.23 .77 3.98 0.67 4.54 0.71 .67 4.12 0.67
Note. Cronbach’s alpha (α) was calculated in the unconfirmed conscientious responder group only. CR = conscientious responder; RR = random 
responder; CRS = Conscientious Responders Scale; PRRS = Pettit Random Responding Scale; SES = Self-Esteem Scale; SRWA = Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism–Short Form (A = Authoritarian Aggression and Submission; C = Conservatism); MPS = Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (CM = 
Concern Over Mistakes; PS = Personal Standards; PE = Parental Expectations; PC = Parental Criticism; D = Doubts; O = Organization); EPQ = Ethics 
Positions Questionnaire (I = Idealism; R = Relativism).
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group produced significantly larger CRS scores (M = 4.53, 
SD = 1.43) and PRRS scores (M = 8.70, SD = 1.26) than their 
RR counterparts (M = 0.74, SD = 0.70, and M = 0.94, SD = 
1.08, respectively), t(63) = 13.86, p < .001, d = 3.37, and 
t(63) = 26.86, p < .001, d = 6.61, respectively. In Experiment 
2, results were much the same. The CR group produced sig-
nificantly larger CRS scores (M = 4.39, SD = 1.27) and PRRS 
scores (M = 6.76, SD = 2.50) than the RR group (M = 0.86, 
SD = 0.81, and M = 0.94, SD = 1.09, respectively), t(378) = 
32.32, p < .001, d = 3.31, and t(378) = 29.34, p < .001, d = 
3.02, respectively. That is, across experiments, CRs were 
much more likely to answer CRS items correctly and PRRS 
items in the frequent direction than were RRs. Hypothesis 1 
was therefore fully supported.
We next calculated zero-order correlations to test 
Hypothesis 2, that the CRS and PRRS would be strongly 
positively related because they both purportedly measure the 
same construct. This hypothesis was also fully supported by 
the data in Experiment 1, r(63) = .87, p < .001, and Experiment 
2, r(378) = .80, p < .001. In general, if responders scored 
highly on the CRS, they were also very likely to have scored 
highly on the PRRS.
In the final stage of the analysis, we examined CRS scores 
in the RR and CR groups to assess the effectiveness of our 
theoretically derived, a priori cutoff score (see Table 2 for 
CRS scores across responder groups and experiments). In the 
RR group in Experiment 1 (n = 35), as expected, 0 partici-
pants answered four or all five CRS items correctly, and only 
1 participant answered three items correctly by chance alone. 
Thus, as expected, fewer than 5% of RRs were capable of 
producing a CRS score of 3, 4, or 5. In contrast, in the CR 
group, 27 participants produced CRS scores of 5, answering 
all CRS items correctly. The remaining 3 participants’ scores 
fell below the 2/3 cutoff at 1, 0, and 0, answering nearly all 
of the items incorrectly. Altogether, our a priori 2/3 cutoff 
produced a classification accuracy rate (i.e., number of cor-
rectly labeled responders to their responders groups/total n 
of that responders group) of 90.00% in the CR group (mak-
ing 3 errors of 30), 97.14% in the RR group (making 1 error 
of 35), and 93.85% averaged across both groups, in full sup-
port of Hypothesis 3. The PRRS similarly correctly labeled 
26 of 30 CR responders as “conscientious” (86.67%), 35 of 
35 RR responders as “random” (100%), and produced an 
overall classification accuracy rate of 93.85%.
In Experiment 2, results were highly similar for the CRS. 
Altogether, our a priori 2/3 cutoff produced a classification 
accuracy rate of 90.05% in the CR group (making 19 errors 
of 191), 96.83% in the RR group (making 6 errors of 189), 
and 93.42% averaged across both groups, in full support of 
Hypothesis 3. In contrast, results were substantially worse 
for the PRRS. The PRRS correctly labeled 47.12% in the CR 
group as “conscientious responders” (101 errors of 191), 
100% in the RR group as “random responders” (0 errors of 
189), and achieved a 73.42% classification accuracy aver-
aged across both groups. Thus, the CRS produced a similar 
result, again exceeding the ≥80% classification accuracy cri-
terion, whereas the PRRS failed to meet that standard.
Given that the PRRS results were so jarringly different 
across the experiments, we reasoned that the problem was 
likely due to the imposition of the a priori 7/8 cutoff score on 
the data. Although it suited the Experiment 1 data just fine, in 
Experiment 2 it was too conservative, leading to too many 
CR participants being labeled as “random responders.” To 
explore this hypothesis further, we conducted binary logistic 
regression analyses for each of the CRS and PRRS measures 
in both sets of experimental data. Specifically, we sought to 
examine whether empirically derived cutoffs generated by 
the logistic regression models would be different and more 
effective than the a priori cutoff scores we imposed on the 
data.
In both sets of data, two binary logistic regressions were 
conducted in which the criterion variable (responder 
group: RR or CR) was regressed on the either the CRS or 
PRRS as the predictor variable. As expected, results of all 
four regressions were significant. For the CRS, results 
showed that 2/3 was the best empirically based cutoff to 
accurately differentiate between CR and RR—the same as 
the theoretically derived cutoff. In contrast, results from 
Table 2. CRS Scores Across Responder Groups and Experiments.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
 CR group (n = 30) RR group (n = 35) CR group (n = 191) RR group (n = 189)
CRS score
Score 
frequency
Score 
percentage
Cumulative 
percentage
Score 
frequency
Score 
percentage
Cumulative 
percentage
Score 
frequency
Score 
percentage
Score 
frequency
Score 
percentage
Score 
frequency
Score 
percentage
5 27 90.00 90.00 0 0.00 0.00 138 72.25 72.25 0 0.00 0.00
4 0 0.00 93.33 0 0.00 0.00 29 15.18 87.43 0 0.00 0.00
3 0 0.00 93.33 1 2.86 2.86 5 2.62 90.05 6 3.17 3.17
2 0 0.00 93.33 2 5.71 8.57 3 1.57 91.62 32 16.93 20.11
1 1 3.33 93.33 19 54.29 62.86 11 5.76 97.38 80 42.33 62.43
0 2 6.67 100 13 37.14 100.00 5 2.62 100 71 37.57 100.00
Note. CRS scores = larger scores (i.e., 5, 4, and 3) reflect a greater rate of conscientious responding. Cumulative percentage = % of sample to score at or above the CRS score. 
CRS = Conscientious Responders Scale; CR = conscientious responder; RR = random responder.
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the PRRS logistic regressions were significant, but showed 
that the a priori 7/8 cutoff was not the optimal cutoff in 
either data set. In Experiment 1, 4/5 was shown to be a bet-
ter empirical cutoff (correctly classifying 100% of CR par-
ticipants and 100% of RR participants), whereas in 
Experiment 2, the best cutoff was 3/4 (correctly classifying 
90% of CR participants and 97.88% of RR participants, 
producing an average accuracy rate of 93.93%). The 
smaller 3/4 cutoff was better in Experiment 2 because CR 
participants in that study produced a lower mean score 
than in Experiment 1.
In sum, these logistic regression data showed that an 
effective CRS cutoff score can be generated a priori using 
probability theory and applied reliably across data sets. In 
contrast, an effective a priori PRRS cutoff cannot be reliably 
applied across data sets. Rather, an empirical cutoff score 
needs to be generated for every data set it is used to optimize 
its discriminative power.
Discussion
The purpose of this investigation was to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of a novel tool for identifying CR and RR in self-
report inventory data. The CRS is a five-item variant of a 
traditional validity scale, which uses instructional item con-
tent and theoretically derived cutoff scores as its means to 
identify responders. Because CRs are assumed to follow test-
ing instructions diligently, answering items as honestly and 
accurately as possible, we expected them to answer all of the 
CRS items correctly. In contrast, because RRs answer items 
indiscriminately, we expected them to account for all of the 
incorrect responses in the data, and only a very small propor-
tion of items answered correctly that were due to chance. In 
our questionnaire, we used a 7-point scale; thus, the chance 
of a RR answering an item correctly was 14.29%. Given this 
rationale, we hypothesized that CRs would produce CRS 
total scores near the ceiling of the scale’s range (i.e., 5) and 
RRs near the floor (i.e., 0). The large gap in expected scale 
scores would make it easy to discriminate between individ-
ual cases of conscientious and random responding. The other 
unique advantage of instructional items over the traditional 
variety used in infrequency scales stems from the fact that 
they can be objectively scored as correct or incorrect. 
Because of this difference, effective cutoff scores can be 
generated using probability theory and therefore eliminate 
the need for extensive normative testing. This would save 
test developers the laborious task of having to validate every 
single validity measure they create, and also allow test 
administrators the flexibility of being able change the CRS 
format depending on their particular testing requirements 
(e.g., by increasing or decreasing the number of its items or 
the size of its response-option scale). These were the main 
ideas behind the CRS when we designed it. This investiga-
tion was conducted to assess whether these lofty specula-
tions were realistic.
Overall, the findings of this investigation were positive 
for the discriminative power and validity of the CRS. As pre-
dicted, CRs produced significantly larger CRS scores than 
RRs across experiments and these group differences were 
large in magnitude. The PRRS, a traditionally developed 
infrequency scale, which was administered alongside the 
CRS for comparative purposes, correlated positively and 
strongly with the CRS. For both measures, CRs produced 
scores toward the ceiling of the measures’ scale range (5 for 
the CRS and 10 for the PRRS), whereas RRs produced mean 
scores near the scale floors (0 for both measures). Because 
the PRRS contains twice the number of items the CRS has, 
the average difference between the CR and RR groups’ sum 
scores was larger for the PRRS and this produced a larger 
effect size. In Experiment 2, this difference was largely elim-
inated because CRs produced PRRS scores nearer the middle 
of the measure’s scoring range.
The implication of this consistency is positive for the 
CRS. Given that across testing situations one can reliably 
expect CRs to produce a score near the ceiling and RRs near 
the floor, an a priori cutoff will be consistently effective at 
identifying responders. In these data, the theoretically 
derived 2/3 cutoff accurately discriminated between CR and 
RR about 93% of the time. Additional analyses with binary 
logistic regression models showed that the theoretically 
derived cutoff was identical to empirically derived cutoff 
scores from both sets of data. This agreement boosts the 
validity of our probability-based approach to generating cut-
off scores.
Results for the PRRS were good, but less positive. Like 
the CRS, the PRRS produced large group differences 
between CR and RR, making distinguishing between them a 
fairly easy task. However, unlike the CRS, the size of the 
group difference in PRRS scores was inconsistent across 
studies. Moreover, the optimal empirical cutoff score 
changed from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2 and in neither 
study agreed with the a priori cutoff score of 7/8. The conse-
quence of this was nicely demonstrated by the dramatic loss 
of discriminative power across studies. In Experiment 1, the 
a priori PRRS cutoff score produced an average classifica-
tion accuracy of 93%, whereas in Experiment 2, its accuracy 
fell to just above 73%, failing to even meet the 80% classifi-
cation standard. Consequently, one has to seriously doubt the 
utility of an a priori PRRS cutoff score, like the one we used 
in this investigation. The PRRS worked best using empiri-
cally based cutoffs. This means that after collecting PRRS 
data, an administrator should generate an equally large set of 
random data and run statistical analyses to identify the best 
empirical cutoff score. In sum, the effort required to use the 
PRRS effectively is far greater than it is to effectively use the 
CRS. With the CRS, a theoretically derived cutoff score can 
work reliably and effectively in a greater variety of testing 
scenarios. One has only to tally responders’ scores and then 
assign them their appropriate responder labels. No normative 
testing is required.
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Appendix
Conscientious Responders Scale (CRS)
1. To answer this question, please choose option number four, “neither agree nor disagree.”
2. Choose the first option—”strongly disagree”—in answering this question.
3. To respond to this question, please choose option number five, “slightly agree.”
4. Please answer this question by choosing option number two, “disagree.”
5. In response to this question, please choose option number three, “slightly disagree.”
Note. In this investigation, the CRS was administered using a 7-point Likert-type scale. To use the CRS effectively, embed its items randomly throughout 
the length of a questionnaire, not all in a row or cluster. To prevent responders from being surprised or confused by the instructional nature of the CRS 
items, we added a line to our questionnaire’s instructions that warned, “Some of the items will ask you to answer them in a particular way . . .”
Limitations and Future Research
Although the findings of this investigation were straightfor-
ward, producing large CRS score differences across 
responder conditions and nearly identical results across 
experiments, the utility of the CRS should be further evalu-
ated using a wider variety of study designs and settings in 
which inventories are commonly used. For example, the 
CRS effective in forensic and psychiatric settings, where 
rates of random responding are highest (Archer et al., 2002; 
McNulty et al., 2003), may be somewhat different than it was 
in this investigation with student, non-disordered samples. 
Given that the CRS only requires respondents to follow sim-
ple instructions, at this point we believe that the CRS is safe 
for use in non-disordered samples and for research purposes. 
Caution should be exercised when using it outside of these 
groups or for individual assessment. In addition, the classifi-
cation accuracy of the CRS should be examined at finer gra-
dients of random responding, for example, in identifying 
responders who engage in random responding in only 25% 
of a questionnaire’s items versus 100% of them. Research on 
the prevalence of random responding suggests that this form 
of intermittent random responding may account for the bulk 
of all random responding cases, as most responders admit to 
responding randomly to at least some of a questionnaire’s 
items, but few report doing it to all of them (e.g., Baer, 
Ballenger, Berry, & Wetter, 1997).
Also, the classification accuracy of the CRS should be 
evaluated against multiple standards of comparison, such as 
the highly regarded validity scales of the MMPI series (the F 
Scale, and VRIN and TRIN scales; Butcher et al., 1989), and 
perhaps the completion times of online-administered ques-
tionnaires. In an online question-naire, for example, it is rea-
sonable to assume that a 100-item inventory completed in 1 
min is not the result of conscientious responding. We predict 
that responders who produce these and the types of abnormal 
responding patterns would also produce very low CRS 
scores.
Finally, there is an off chance that embedding validity 
scales like the CRS or PRRS in a questionnaire may exacer-
bate random responding by lowering the questionnaire’s face 
validity. Face validity is defined as the extent to which item 
content seems appropriate for the purposes of a given testing 
situation (Holden & Jackson, 1979). For example, when 
assessing sadism, an item like “I enjoy hurting others” has 
higher face validity than the item “I would enjoy the occupa-
tion of a butcher.” Because the CRS items instruct one how 
to respond, which is very different from what people expect 
to find in an inventory, their odd nature may sap the motiva-
tion of some responders to participate conscientiously. 
Perhaps, even the notion of being told what to do may moti-
vate some individuals to respond incompliantly in a fit of 
psychological reactance (Miron & Brehm, 2006). With infre-
quency scales, their item content may seem so absurd in 
some cases that responders may feel ridiculous and put off in 
having to respond to them, which similarly may sap their 
motivation to act conscientiously. As far as we are aware, 
this hypothesis that random responding scales exacerbate 
random responding has not been experimentally examined 
and perhaps should be pursued in future research. We specu-
late, however, that given the prevalence and utility of some 
low-face-validity inventories (e.g., the MMPI series), if there 
was an effect here to find, it would be negligible in size and 
fully compensated by the positive effects of validity scales 
(i.e., being able to discriminate between CRs and RRs).
Conclusion
Due to the many costs associated with random responding 
scales, basic and applied psychologists rarely use them when 
administering inventories. This investigation aimed to rem-
edy this situation with the introduction and preliminary vali-
dation of the CRS, a five-item measure that uses instructional 
item content to achieve this goal. Results across two experi-
ments were compelling in that effect sizes were large, results 
were consistent across samples, and the CRS was accurate in 
classifying responders about 93% of the time. Simply put, by 
embedding the CRS items randomly throughout a question-
naire, researchers can use endorsements of the CRS items as 
reliable indicators of whether data were generated conscien-
tiously and should be retained or whether they were pro-
duced randomly and should be deleted.
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Notes
1. Psychological inventories contain items that cannot be 
answered in an objectively correct or incorrect manner, 
unlike educational or intelligence test items (e.g., 2 + 2 = ?). 
Personality-test item responses merely reflect the extent to 
which respondents agree or disagree with an item’s content or 
how much it is true (e.g., I like to read).
2. Importantly, changes can be made to the number of the 
Conscientious Responders Scale (CRS) items or the size of 
its response-option scale without affecting its effectiveness 
at identifying conscientious responders. The flexibility of the 
CRS, or of any validity scale developed with instructional item 
content, stems from the fact that effective cutoff scores can 
be generated with ease using probability theory. This makes it 
considerably simpler to suit the CRS to one’s needs and more 
likely to be used by testers.
3. Although we cannot be entirely sure that low CRS scorers 
are in fact random responders, we can be confident that these 
responders are unable or unwilling to follow simple testing 
directions and that alone is enough to invalidate their data.
References
Altemeyer, B. (1996). The authoritarian specter. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Arbisi, P. A., & Ben-Porath, Y. S. (1995). An MMPI-2 infrequent 
response scale for use with psychopathological populations: 
The Infrequency-Psychopathology Scale, F(p). Psychological 
Assessment, 7, 424-431.
Archer, R. P., Handel, R. W., Lynch, K. D., & Elkins, D. E. (2002). 
MMPI-A validity scale uses and limitation in detecting vary-
ing levels of random responding. Journal of Personality 
Assessment, 78, 417-431.
Baer, R. A., Ballenger, J., Berry, D. T. R., & Wetter, M. W. (1997). 
Detection of random responding on the MMPI-A. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 68, 139-151.
Ben-Porath, Y. S., & Waller, N. G. (1992). Five big issues in clini-
cal personality assessment: A rejoinder to Costa and McCrae. 
Psychological Assessment, 4, 23-25.
Bentler, P. M., Jackson, D. J., & Messick, S. (1971). Identification 
of content and style: A two-dimensional interpretation of 
acquiescence. Psychological Bulletin, 76, 186-204.
Blascovich, J., & Tomaka, J. (1993). Measures of self-esteem. 
In J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), 
Measures of personality and social psychological attitudes 
(3rd ed., pp. 115-160). Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social 
Research.
Bobbio, A., Canova, L., & Manganelli, A. M. (2010). Conservative 
ideology, economic conservatism, and causal attributions for 
poverty and wealth. Current Psychology, 29, 222-234.
Bruehl, S., Lofland, K. R., Sherman, J. J., & Carlson, C. R. (1998). 
The variable responding scale for detection of random respond-
ing on the Multidimensional Pain Inventory. Psychological 
Assessment, 10, 3-9.
Butcher, J. N., Dahlstrom, W. G., Graham, J. R., Tellegen, A., 
& Kaemmer, B. (1989). MMPI-2: Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory-2: Manual for administration and scor-
ing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Clark, M. E., Gironda, R. J., & Young, R. W. (2003). Detection 
of back responding: Effectiveness of MMPI-2 and person-
ality assessment inventory validity indices. Psychological 
Assessment, 15, 223-234.
Credé, M. (2010). Random responding as a threat to the validity of 
effect size estimates in correlational research. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 70, 596-612.
Davis, M. A., Andersen, M. G., & Curtis, M. B. (2001). Measuring 
ethical ideology in business ethics: A critical analysis of the 
Ethics Position Questionnaire. Journal of Business Ethics, 32, 
35-53.
Frost, R. O., Marten, P., Lahart, C., & Rosenblate, R. (1990). The 
dimensions of perfectionism. Cogntive Therapy and Research, 
14, 449-468.
Forsyth, D. R. (1980). A taxonomy of ethical ideologies. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 175-184.
Holden, R. R., & Jackson, D. N. (1979). Item subtlety and face 
validity in personality assessment. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 47, 459-468.
Johnson, J. A. (2005). Ascertaining the validity of individual pro-
tocols from web-based personality inventories. Journal of 
Research in Personality, 39, 103-129.
Manganelli Rattazzi, A. M., Bobbio, A., & Canova, L. (2007). 
A short version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) 
Scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 43, 1223-1234.
McNulty, J. L., Forbey, J. D., Graham, J. R., Ben-Porath, Y. 
S., Black, M. S., Anderson, S. V., & Burlew, A. K. (2003). 
MMPI-2 validity scale characteristics in a correctional sample. 
Assessment, 10, 288-298.
Meade, A. W., & Craig, S. B. (2012). Identifying careless responses 
in survey data. Psychological Methods, 17, 437-455.
Miron, A. M., & Brehm, J. W. (2006). Reactance theory—40 years 
later. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 37, 9-18.
Osborne, J. W., & Blanchard, M. R. (2011). Random responding 
from participants is a threat to the validity of social science 
results. Frontiers in Psychology, 1, Article 220. doi:10.3389/
fpsyg.2010.00220
Parker, W. D., & Adkins, K. K. (1995). A psychometric examina-
tion of the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale. Journal of 
Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 17, 323-334.
Pettit, F. A. (1999). Response sets in World Wide Web and paper-
and-pencil personality questionnaires (Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation). York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Pettit, F. A. (2002). A comparison of World-Wide Web and paper-
and-pencil personality questionnaires. Behavior Research 
Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 34, 50-54.
10 SAGE Open
Pinsoneault, T. B. (2002). A Variable Response Inconsistency 
scale and a True Response Inconsistency scale for the Millon 
Adolescent Clinical Inventory. Personality Assessment, 14, 
320-330.
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sears, D. O. (1986). College sophomores in the laboratory: 
Influences of a narrow data base on social psychology’s view of 
human nature. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
51, 515-530.
Author Biographies
Zdravko Marjanovic is a social and personality psychologist at 
Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, Canada. His 
research spans the areas of prosocial behavior, reactions to eco-
nomic crisis, and psychological measurement. 
C. Ward Struthers, Robert Cribbie, and Esther R. Greenglass 
are all professors of psychology at York University in Ontario, 
Canada. Their work includes various topics such as attributions and 
forgiveness, statistical analysis of psychological data, and coping 
amid crisis, respectively.
